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Abstract
Community engagement is commonly regarded as a crucial entry point for gaining access and securing trust
during humanitarian emergencies. In this article, we present three case studies of community engagement
encounters during the West African Ebola outbreak. They represent strategies commonly implemented by the
humanitarian response to the epidemic: communication through comités de veille villageois in Guinea,
engagement with NGO-affiliated community leadership structures in Liberia and indirect mediation to chiefs in
Sierra Leone. These case studies are based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out before, during and after the
outbreak by five anthropologists involved in the response to Ebola in diverse capacities. Our goal is to represent
and conceptualise the Ebola response as a dynamic interaction between a response apparatus, local populations
and intermediaries, with uncertain outcomes that were negotiated over time and in response to changing
conditions. Our findings show that community engagement tactics that are based on fixed notions of legitimacy
are unable to respond to the fluidity of community response environments during emergencies.
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Introduction
During the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic, an
estimated US$ 10 billion was spent to contain the disease
in the region and globally. The response brought
together multilateral agencies, bilateral partnerships,
private enterprises and foundations, local governments
and communities. Social mobilisation efforts were
pivotal components of the response architecture
(Gillespie et al., 2016; Laverack and Manoncourt, 2015;
Oxfam International, 2015). They relied on grassroots
community actors, classic figures of humanitarian work
or development (Olivier de Sardan, 2005): chiefs, women,
elders and youths seen as legitimate actors, able to both
represent and influence the ‘community’ – that is, to be
intermediaries of community engagement between the
intervention and local populations. This article shows
how both the legitimacy of these actors embodying the
response and eventually the intervention itself was
contested and negotiated through localised encounters.1
We present three ethnographic cases based on first-
hand, epidemic-related field observations of community
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engagement and local resistance. The authors were
involved in diverse ways in Sierra Leone (Luisa Enria),
Liberia (Almudena Mari Saez2) and Guinea (Frédéric Le
Marcis and Sylvain Landry B. Faye) and as part of the
global response coordination (Sharon Abramowitz). These
case studies, directly observed by the authors, present three
community engagement encounters representative of
practices regularly implemented to gain communities’
trust and stem potential resistance to epidemic control
measures: communication through elders and youths in
Guinea; engagement with NGO-affiliated community
leadership structures in Liberia; indirect mediation to
chiefs in Sierra Leone. Inspired by the extended-case-study
method developed by the Manchester School (Gluckman,
1940), we illuminate our ethnography by paying attention
to the long history of the relationship between power and
population.
The cases are presented chronologically in order to
align with the history of theWest Africa epidemic. In the
first case, Sylvain Landry B. Faye details a case from
Kolobengou, Guinea, in whichMinistry of Health efforts
to mobilise traditional and political elites clashed with
locally legitimate youth and local leaders over the
distribution of Ebola-relief goods. In the second case,
from Liberia, Almudena Mari Saez narrates negotiations
between community-based organisations and the NGO
in charge of opening a new Ebola Treatment Unit at the
SKD3 Stadium inMonrovia. In the final case, from Sierra
Leone, Luisa Enria discusses the role of chiefs through
the confrontation between the police and young Sierra
Leoneans in Bamoi Luma when authorities violently
imposed the closure of a market in order to avoid a
resurgence of the epidemic.
Despite their heterogeneity, the cases constitute what
can be termed comparables, in reference to the work of
the French historianMarcel Détienne (2002, 2009). They
are emblematic of the interactions at play during
emergency encounters. They speak to each other as
they highlight the contested nature of legitimacy, its
roots both in the longue durée and in contemporary
issues. They shed light on the important role played
during epidemics by the too often ignored intermediaries
of the international intervention. Comparative
anthropology of the kind we develop here has the
potential to detect and analyse ways of thought and
practice and situate them in the context of both localised
and world-historical events, contexts, histories and
discourses (Détienne, 2009: 61).
Community engagement is commonly regarded as the
axis on which to secure access and trust in humanitarian
emergencies. However, its implementation remains an open
debate. Far away from ready-made engagement tactics
(such as systematically calling the chiefs, elders, women and
youths), anthropologically informed assessments of the
West African Ebola response paint a more complex picture
of engagement in practice, revealing murky social dynamics
in some encounters, including aggressive appeals for
collaboration, top-down decision-making and a lack of
accountability (Calain and Poncin, 2015; Carrión Martín
et al., 2016; Cohn and Kutalek 2016; Gomez-Temesio and
Le Marcis, 2017; Oosterhoff andWilkinson, 2015; Tengbeh
et al., 2018; Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017; Wilkinson et al.,
2017). Building on this work, our ethnographic case studies
aim to understand the sources and contingent nature of the
legitimacy of a large-scale humanitarian intervention. We
represent the Ebola response as a dynamic interaction
between local populations, intermediaries and resource
brokers, with uncertain outcomes that were negotiated
over time and in response to rapidly changing conditions on
the ground.
A comparative approach allowed us to develop an
analysis of the formation, negotiation and rejection of the
legitimacy of local, national and international actors and
interventions that had different implications for the
duration of the epidemic and the effectiveness of the
response in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. There were
significant regional and national differences in local
health and economic needs, national histories and
authorities’ handling of community engagement. How-
ever, our comparative approach also illustrates how,
across the three countries, social life, communal trust
and political legitimacy worked around, through and in
conflict with formal and informal community engage-
ment interventions and local leadership structures. The
narratives we present below reveal the restricted range of
options for humanitarian NGOs and state representa-
tives in encounters, which can have significant con-
sequences both for communities and humanitarian
workers, ranging from successful and participatory
engagement to open hostility and violence. They testify
to negotiations revolving around the question of who can
be trusted for what, and who can speak for and be
listened to by the community, according to a shifting
array of moral and political rules.
With our focus on the intermediaries who connected
the Ebola response to local populations, each study
examines how the legitimacy of the response generated
tensions and mediation rooted in the immediate turmoil
surrounding the epidemic but also in the deeper histories,
social legacies and politics. In order to provide a thick
description of contestations over legitimacy, we pay
particular attention to the authority of those not formally
recognised to have power – the cadets sociaux, a common
notion in Francophone Africanist social sciences (Bayart,
1989; Meillassoux, 1975). Cadets sociaux are the opposite
of elders or ‘doyens’ (individuals in a position of power
because of their rank, regardless of their age). The word
‘sociaux’ implies that they are young and therefore24
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without power, but not necessarily because of their age.
Their status (and lack of authority) is defined by their
structural location in society: they may be youths, or old
but second-born, or women or foreigners with no rights.
Focusing on intermediaries, mediation and in particular
on the role of the cadets sociaux enables us to show how
social dynamics are re-enacted in a context of crisis.
Background
Historical analyses have attributed the failure of the
Guinean, Liberian and Sierra Leonian governmental
responses at the onset of the epidemic to a number of
factors related to history and international political
economy. They range from the legacy of the transatlantic
slave trade and colonial histories to economic structures
built around international extractive industries and aid
dependency (Benton and Dionne, 2015; Richardson
et al., 2016; Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017). Externally
imposed structural adjustment in the 1980s hollowed out
all (non-military) essential state functions. This, in turn,
transformed citizens’ relation to and expectations of the
postcolonial state and its legitimacy. Exacerbated by
experiences of conflict and instability, weak health
sectors and economies and an eroded social contract
set the foundations for the crisis of 2014.
The place of these countries in global history and
contemporary dependencies was re-inscribed in the
nature of the response. Under the PHEIC (Public Health
Emergency of International Concern) declared by the
World Health Assembly on 8 August 2014, it was
conducted through a joint partnership between the
international community and governments of the Mano
River region in a manner heavily informed by past
colonial relationships. In each of the three countries,
humanitarian interventions or clinical trials were largely
run through national institutions with direct ties to
former colonial powers (France intervened in Guinea,
the UK in Sierra Leone, and US organisations were the
first in Liberia).4
A comparison of social resistance and engagement in
the Ebola response in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea
reveals that explanations for the challenges encountered
by the response lie in these political configurations, not
culture, as was often implied by initial analyses
(Chandler et al., 2015).
In Guinea, both history and contemporary events
shape how populations related to the Guinean state.
Sekou Touré’s state-led demystification policies had
aimed at destroying animist cults considered as back-
ward. These policies continued through the beginning of
the Conté presidency (1958–80) – direct evidence of the
violence of the state and its disregard for the population
(McGovern, 2013). The current Guinean extractive
economy, a ‘liberal extractivist regime that primarily
benefits external actors’ (Knierzinger, 2014: 4), has led
ordinary Guineans to feel that a corrupt political elite
defends only its own interests and those of foreign
companies. And where people can only witness what
they understand as predation, they turn to violent words
or deeds as a means to be recognised. This has been well
described with regards to youth politics in Conakry
(Philipps, 2013).
The contested nature of traditional authority in Sierra
Leone is similarly emblematic of state–society relations.
British colonialism left behind a bifurcated state
(Mamdani, 1996), with despotic chieftaincies in the
hinterlands and a central state without roots in society.
The civil war (1991–2002) was the culmination of
decades of alienation and socio-economic exclusion,
and rebel factions directed their anger at representatives
of the ‘rotten system’, including chiefs, as symbols of
abuses of power and the marginalisation of youth (Peters,
2011; Richards, 1996). Questions of legitimacy resurfaced
after the war as heated debates emerged around the
reconstitution of the chieftaincy. Despite pre-war abuses,
populations nevertheless perceived chiefs and customary
law as closer to communities than central government,
but they called for reform (Fanthorpe, 2006). On the eve
of the Ebola outbreak, therefore, chiefs maintained their
power but it was not unchallenged.
Historical divisions between Americo- and African-
Liberians have marked the fight for power and socio-
political identities in Liberia (Ellis, 1999). During the
political instability of the 1980s and the fourteen years of
civil war (1989–2003), these distinctions became
exacerbated, with the legitimacy of ‘traditional’ and
‘modern’ forms of power becoming instrumentalised
and questioned (Fuest, 2010). Youths’ and women’s
agency in navigating the conflict (as both fighters and
victims) and post-conflict periods (Utas, 2005) set the
foundations for understanding their claims for
representation in decision-making arenas.
It was against these historical backdrops that the
intertwined histories of the Ebola epidemic in the Mano
River region broke out. As the crisis gained pace through
2014, it became clear to national and international
responders that top-down approaches were failing to
generate the kinds of behaviour change seen as essential
to bend the curve. In some instances, community
leadership took charge independently by developing
‘indigenous’ strategies to contain the social and physical
risks posed by the virus (Richards, 2016). The national
and international response architecture alsomade efforts
to ensure ‘local leadership’, primarily by calling on
community leaders to mobilise their constituencies
around regulations such as safe burial practices. This
requiredmaking responsemeasures ‘palatable’while also
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enforcingmore punitive containment methods (Caremel
et al., 2017). TheWHO (2018) has cited this ‘localisation’
of the response as a key factor in its ultimate success.
Through our ethnographic accounts we aim to disrupt
this linear narrative by showing how community
engagement was inscribed in local social dynamics and
produced through fierce contestations and local-level
mediation, with uncertain and unstable outcomes.
Methodology
This is an article about small events during the Ebola
response in the Mano River region. Each ethnographic
case study presents original data to show how localised
social interactions played out during critical moments.
These snapshots talk about the present but reveal the
longue durée.
The five authors were closely involved in the national
(Sylvain Landry B. Faye, Frédéric Le Marcis, Almudena
Mari Saez and Luisa Enria) and international Ebola
response (Sharon Abramowitz) in different capacities:
carrying out ethnographic research, providing guidance
on the socio-cultural aspects of clinical interventions and
community engagement, advising multiple international
actors, and as animator of a global network aimed at
sharing information during the epidemic (Abramowitz,
2017; Anoko, 2014; Enria et al., 2016; Faye, 2015; Le
Marcis, 2015; Moulin, 2015; Saez and Borchert, 2014).
We conducted fieldwork, surveys, and interviews in
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia.5 We interacted with
local actors, government officials and aid and healthcare
workers before, during and after the epidemic. Our
research was supplemented with past anthropological
and historical research.
Our analysis used a comparative approach,6 focusing
on intermediate-level actors in each country; it
questioned the legitimacy of the response at their level
and, by extension, of the response itself. Intermediaries,
chosen by the response for their capacity to represent
and influence ‘communities’, have indeed embodied the
Ebola response and, in turn, produced and challenged its
legitimacy. This has allowed us to link national and
international perceptions of how local authority should
be exercised with tensions between the threat of coercion
and the use of persuasion.
Findings
Guinea: Comités de veille villageois in
Kolobengou
The leading instrument of community engagement in
Guinea, Comités de veille villageois (CVV), or village-
watch communities, was established through a UNICEF
initiative in Guinea in 2014. Officially, their members
were supposed to be selected by community members. In
the prefectures of Gueckedou, Forecariah and Coyah,
CVVs were made up of local elites, official representatives
of youths and women, religious leaders, traditional
healers and Ebola survivors. The convening of the CVVs
was intended to support the Ebola response by creating a
local mechanism for resolving issues around population
resistance and epidemiological surveillance; but such
efforts often had the counter-effect of provoking resist-
ance (Abramowitz et al., 2017; Faye, 2017; Gillespie et al.,
2016; Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017). As we will show,
cadets sociaux challenged official CVVs and have retained
the legitimate authority to carry out community
surveillance and community defence. In doing so, they
reprised the monitoring and protection role they played
during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts in the
2000s, when the Guinean army was seen as ineffective in
protecting its own people against the incursion of rebels
from neighbouring countries (McGovern, 2017).
In July 2014, Sylvain Landry B. Faye witnessed the
population of Guinea’s Tékoulo sub-prefecture engaged
in a series of provocative actions towards Ebola-response
teams that could be characterised as violent. Local
communities concealed patients suspected of having
Ebola, refused to allow family members to be registered
on follow-up contact lists, refused to support safe burials
and banned intervention teams from entering villages.
Kolobengou village, part of Tékoulo sub-prefecture,
was one place where cases of Ebola were identified.
Village youths destroyed the bridge leading to the village
to prevent the passage of humanitarian vehicles sus-
pected of spreading disease. Chiefs were sent away when
they visited family compounds. Young people who
spontaneously organised themselves to raise awareness
and protect ‘their communities’ violently challenged
Ebola response teams, banned foreigners, organised
surveillance brigades to ensure that no one entered the
village and sought the arbitration of regional political
authorities (the préfet, or governor).
To solve the problem, responders targeted traditional
healers, sacred forest leaders, Christian and Muslim
religious leaders, hunters, migrant associations and
councils of elders; all of whom held a traditional
legitimacy that conferred authority in the predominantly
Kissi region. But in a context of growing mistrust
between those in power and the populace, and a growing
critique from cadets sociaux, the strategy of bringing
local leaders to the fore in order to ‘develop trust’ and
improve the community acceptability of response activi-
ties did not work. Prefectural and local authorities, elders
and migrant associations in the capital city who tried
mediation to facilitate access in the reluctant villages of
Kolobengou and Wabengou were assaulted.26
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The Guinean government instructed all of its leading
ministry officials to go to Gueckedou, the capital of the
prefecture. In order to comply with this call from the
government, the Minister of Health, the colonel doctor
Rémy Lamah, a native of the Guinée forestière (Nzér-
ékoré) region, planned a field visit together with the
President of the National Assembly, who was from the
nearby town of Kissidougou. In preparation for the visit,
senior health officials arrived to mobilise local authority
figures (such as elders, youths and political leaders) to
negotiate an agreement that would allow access to the
resistant populations in exchange for the provision of
financial resources.
Seeing an opportunity, the young people from Kolo-
bengou who lived in Gueckedou offered to reach out to
their peers in the village to try to resolve the conflict. At
the same time, the Council of Elders of Gueckedou
proposed to visit the village to raise awareness. Thus, two
missions supported by the Minister of Health found
themselves on the ground at the same time, creating a
situation in the village in which there were too many
people with too many agendas. They all came from
outside – they lived in Gueckedou – but they all claimed
to represent the population. The joint presence of two
groups of people from outside the village but claiming to
represent it irritated the population. Both groups were
attacked by village youths living in the locality, who had
established community-watch committees to protect the
village.
The attacks shocked the national leadership then
visiting Gueckedou, and the regional government sought
to reassert its authority and show firmness. The préfet
ordered the arrest of the perpetrators. Eighteen people
were arrested and imprisoned in the Gueckedou gen-
darmerie. While they awaited trial and possible transfer
to Conakry, the revolt and defiant attitudes in the villages
was exacerbated. Finally, Sylvain Landry B. Faye was
brought in by the WHO to facilitate a community
mediation process that would lead to reconciliation and
enable community mobilisation and empowerment for
the Ebola response. The goals were to enter the village
and allow intervention teams to do the investigative work
to examine the history of Ebola development and its
transmission chains within the community.
Liberia: Community Liaisons and the SKD
Stadium Case
August 2014 was a month of big changes in the Ebola-
containment campaign in Liberia’s capital, Monrovia.
On 1 August 2014, Liberian President Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf declared a national state of emergency and
mandated a controversial and widely disliked policy of
mandatory cremation for all persons who had died from
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), as well as mandatory
lockdowns and the notorious militarised quarantine of
the West Point area, one of Monrovia’s most densely
populated slums.
Another part of the Monrovia, Montserrado County’s
sixth electoral district, called District 6, one of the most
populated urban areas in the country, hosted two of the
city’s largest Ebola Treatment Units (ETU), ELWA 2 and
ELWA 3,7 near the SKD Stadium. It has been described
elsewhere how ETUs – specific infrastructure for the
isolation of patients from infectious diseases –were used in
previous filoviruses epidemic emergencies (Boumandouki
et al., 2005; Gomez-Temesio, 2018; Milleliri et al., 2004;
Park and Umlauf 2014). Their intrinsic quarantine logic
and inability to provide care became rapidly obvious to the
population. More than half of the patients admitted to
ETUs died, and their bodies were buried anonymously
(except in Liberia, where they have beenmainly cremated),
fostering rumours of body parts being harvested and of
deliberate infection (Calain and Poncin, 2015; Gomez-
Temesio, 2018; Gomez-Temesio and Le Marcis, 2017).
Residents reported that living near ELWA 2 and ELWA 3
at this time was traumatising. Neighbours expressed the
fear and mistrust that came with having an ETU close to
them and of having been continuously exposed to death.
From the beginning of Ebola’s arrival in District 6,
residents anticipated a slow and inadequate government
response. Local citizens organised themselves into
community task forces and started their own quarantine
initiatives, which included visits, food and financial
support.
In September 2014, an ETU-construction project in
the SKD Stadium caused District 6 residents to protest in
the streets. Liberian government and NGO representa-
tives, alarmed at the mass demonstration, told residents
that the newly constructed building would be used for
Ebola supply storage. The authorities that had ignored
residents’ concerns and fears were now deceiving them.
But the protest against the ETU’s installation created a
space for negotiation with the district authorities and
opened an avenue for local demands of accountability
and operational safety.
After the protest, the National Ebola Task Force and
the District 6 Ebola Task Force called a meeting of the
task forces, District 6 City Council, NGO representatives
and community representatives. They wanted to discuss
how the latter could live with the ETU in their
neighbourhood. The ETU’s removal was not on the
agenda. Almudena Mari Saez worked with a District 6
resident community liaison for the International Rescue
Committee (IRC), which was leading the SKD Stadium
ETU’s construction. The community liaison, a woman,
had been nominated by the community to head the
community Ebola task force and was later elected as a
community leader. In that role, she participated in the
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negotiations concerning the building of the SKD Sta-
dium ETU.
The meeting captured the community’s priorities and
conveyed the sense that the government needed to be
held accountable for the welfare of local populations even
in the Ebola emergency. District 6 inhabitants’ principal
issue was sanitation and waste-water management, as
sewage from the stadium bathrooms drained directly into
the neighbouring communities. Residents were also
worried about the economic impact of opening an ETU
inside the stadium. For many, the stadium served as their
main source of income, social, religious and sporting
activities providing side-business opportunities, such as
the sale of food and drink. There was real concern that,
like other Ebola-treatment centres, the SKD Stadium
would be unusable after the epidemic because of the risk
of infection. In subsequent meetings, an agreement was
reached to provide materials to redirect the flow of
sewage from the stadium into the main sewage system.
The community insisted that the IRC include a quota of
hires for all ETU positions directly from the community.
Youth leaders agreed to work with the district leadership,
the Liberian government and international organisations
to raise awareness of Ebola through a new outreach
program that included the training of district and
community task forces. The community liaison assistant
held weekly meetings with the community Ebola task
forces and the city council to inform them of the
admission of patients to the ETU. Some requests were
technical and were easily answered by Water, Sanitation
and Hygiene (WASH) teams, clinicians or psychosocial
teams associated with the ETUs.
Though not all complaints were addressed, the
communities in District 6 chose their representatives in
the negotiation with international partners. New legit-
imacies were built through a dialogic learning process
that extended through the construction period and into
the operational phase. As of 2016, District 6’s leaders and
council representatives continued to cooperate to resolve
concerns through the establishment of a new com-
munity-based organisation called Taking Initiatives, and
youths have used the Ebola experience as a precedent for
establishing new initiatives.
Sierra Leone: The Bamoi Luma Case
Kambia District, where Luisa Enria worked as part of an
Ebola-vaccine trial to study perceptions of medical
research during the emergency, was one of the last
districts in Sierra Leone to achieve zero cases. In July
2015, the military-led Operation Northern Push was put
in place alongside a ‘community ownership model’ in
which Kambia’s chiefs were actively involved. They were
‘chief community mobilisers’ but also had to impose
unpopular measures, including setting fines for violating
Ebola regulations and punishing resistance. Neverthe-
less, members of the District Ebola Response Committee
argued that these measures were ultimately accepted
because of respect for the authority of the chieftaincy:
‘Our people do not know government… it is only the
chief they know’.
In January 2016, however, the District Ebola Response
Committee was faced with an unexpected challenge: a
confrontation between young people and the police in
Bamoi, home to the biggest market in the North (the
Luma), in a dispute emerging from a new Ebola case,
which threatened to shut down all economic activity.
Sierra Leone had been declared Ebola-free two months
earlier, although many of the emergency regulations
remained in place. On 14 January, a new case suddenly
emerged. A young woman who had travelled from
Guinea and had stopped in Bamoi on her way to
Magburaka, where she eventually died, was confirmed
Ebola-positive (Fofana, 2016). This sparked nationwide
controversy, and in Kambia, many didn’t believe that the
new case was real. Some suspected that Ebola workers
were trying to make money from the epidemic once
more. ‘Workers at the treatment centre jumped with joy
when they heard!’was a common story told in poyo (palm
wine) bars. In Bamoi, contact tracing proved a challenge:
of the fifty people to be quarantined, most escaped and
resisted the ring-vaccination efforts. In the following
days, district officials discussed whether to shut down the
market, as had been done at the peak of the epidemic, but
an official decision was not communicated.
In the early morning of 26 January, Bamoi residents
who went to the mosque heard a sudden announcement
that the market would close. The announcement was
broadcast through the mosque loudspeakers, and an
armed Operational Support Division (OSD) of military
police arrived in town to enforce it. As young men took
to the streets to protest this affront to their livelihoods,
police officers shot a live round and injured three young
men. In the midst of the confusion, the Chief, who
claimed he had not been warned that the closure would
go ahead, attempted to coordinate local sub-chiefs to
intervene. Many refused and went into hiding for fear of
reprisals. For the rest of the morning, the OSD patrolled
the empty streets, guns slung over their shoulders, as
young men watched them in silence from closed market
stalls. As a district official arrived from Kambia,
bystanders began shouting about police abuses, pointing
to the pool of blood on the street. An observer tried to
reassure the crowds that ‘big people’ – district autho-
rities, like chiefs – would be coming. A young man
laughed: ‘Big people? They are the ones who sent these
people to kill us.’
By the afternoon, chiefs remained conspicuously
absent, but national politicians, ‘sons of the soil’ with28
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aspirations, arrived in Bamoi and denounced the closure
of the Luma, in an effort to shift the blame from
government and on to local actors. The crowd retaliated
by burning down the police station. At night, they set up
checkpoints to check vehicles for local authorities: ‘If the
Chief makes the mistake of going through the Luma he
has another thing coming!’
In the weeks that followed, Kambians blamed local
stakeholders and the Chief for failing to communicate
the closure. A slogan painted on one of the local coffee
shops (attaya base) in Bamoi – ‘Ebola Phase II: it didn’t
work’ – connected the riots with broader suspicions
surrounding the outbreak and authorities’ complicity.
The new case had been another opportunity to ‘eat Ebola
money’. The riots were seen as a sign that people would
now ‘stand up for their rights’ and put an end to big
people’s profiteering. The Chief was aware of the anger
directed at him and other authorities during the riots, at
their perceived inability to protect the interest of the
community in the face of the cynical interests of the
response. Unlike national politicians, who could distance
themselves from the decision to close the market, the
Chief highlighted the risk to his safety during the riot as
an explanation for his absence from the scene. It was
people like him, he noted, that traders held responsible
for continued hardship despite the emergency having
been declared over.
Discussion
Each of these events reveals the fluidity of legitimacy, the
importance of negotiation and the significance of roles
and decisions taken by different kinds of intermediaries
navigating the response (Vigh, 2006). These three ‘acts of
resistance’ also demonstrate the complex political
processes and the specific dynamics of compromise
underpinning the social reproduction of the Ebola
response at local level. They show the crucial need to
pay attention to the positionalities of all interlocutors
involved in these encounters, including self-reflexive
attention to one’s own position (as researcher or
humanitarian worker).
The story of Ebola is often told through two primary
actors: ‘the response’ and ‘the population’. This excludes
the story of how the legitimacy of elites charged with
‘mobilising’ communities was contested by different
sectors of local populations. For example, cadets sociaux,
like women and youths, sought to protect their com-
munities, showing willingness to take an active part in
crisis management and to be recognised as legitimate
contenders for power in the marketplace of local
influence. Moments of crisis create opportunities for
authority negotiation and competition. As our examples
show, the terms of these contestations are influenced
(but not determined) by long- and short-term histories.
Each case tells a specific story.
In the Kolobengou case in Guinea, it is apparent that
the involvement of the ‘wrong’ elites through the CVV
mechanism generated anger. In Kolobengou, local
youths protested violently, with support from villagers.
The latter saw efforts at mediation as benefiting only a
minority, who claimed to be representative while living
in the regional capital. This echoes analyses concerning
the involvement of youth groups (‘staff’) in political
mobilisation in urban Guinea (Philipps, 2013).
In the SKD Stadium case in Monrovia, Liberia, it is
evident that the community liaison had distorted expec-
tations of local leadership, some of which were informed
by previous humanitarian experiences during and after
the civil war. The Ebola Task Force’s disregard of local
sensitivities, context and capabilities were put in sharp
relief when transferring people to the ETU, collecting and
incinerating corpses, asking people to monitor their
neighbours, and during quarantines and lockdowns.
Residents perceived the intervention as a threat to their
livelihoods, social networks, lived environment and to the
already weak public health infrastructure. Through their
negotiations around practical issues such as employment,
waste-water management and the economic impact of an
ETU opening in the stadium, young people were able to
take part as legitimate actors in the interventions that
affected their realities, setting the basis for long-term
engagement in their communities.
Lastly, the Bamoi Luma case in Sierra Leone revealed
the unstable nature of power. It is not that the chieftaincy
was not trusted – rather, the Chief’s authority, like that of
other intermediaries, was subject to challenge. In the
context of historical disputes over the source and uses of
political authority, and in particular of tense relations
between youths and elders, chiefs’ abilities to effectively
mobilise communities vary across districts and over
time. The trust that was gained at the height of the
epidemic could be lost again as the material benefits
associated with humanitarian interventions were seen to
be unevenly shared.
The lesson here for community engagement during
emergencies is that no ‘one size fits all’, that inflexible or
top-down responses are not appropriate and that
community engagement requires the fundamental rec-
ognition that within communities power and legitimacy
are always contested resources. Effective community
engagement requires a dynamic awareness of history,
context and power that remains conscious of how
legitimacy and authority are pursued or rejected, volatile
or stable, won, contested or undermined, hoarded or
distributed, and how they change over time (Boissevain,
1974; Ferguson, 1994; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Olivier de
Sardan, 2005).
The
2014–16
W
est
A
frica
Ebola
Epidem
ic
29
Downloaded from manchesterhive.com at 08/25/2020 01:58:54PM
via free access
Theories of international development, humanitarian
response and health communication highlight the role of
local leaders as brokers of acceptability and access.
However, these theories’ models of community engage-
ment are often based on fixed notions of legitimacy that are
unable to respond to the fluidity of social dynamics during
a crisis. Producing more or better rules of engagement will
not resolve uncertainties, nor will the development of
cultural taxonomies or overly defined concepts. The always
negotiated nature of power is an essential feature of social
life. Engagement is always a risk, and success in mobilis-
ation requires an acceptance of contingencies and an
ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
Notes
1 Frédéric Le Marcis would like to acknowledge the
European Union (Horizon 2020 programme, grant N°
666092 REACTION!). Almudena Mari Saez would like to
thank the International Rescue Committee for the opport-
unity to conduct this work. Luisa Enria would like to
acknowledge support from the Economic and Social
Research Council (Future Research Leaders Fellowship
ES/N01717X/1) and the Innovative Medicines Initiative 2
Joint Undertaking under grant agreement No 115854, and
to thank Mahmood H. Bangura for research assistance.
2 Almudena Mari Saez would like to thank the neighbours
around the SKD Stadium who agreed to talk and share
their concerns with the liaison person and herself.
3 Abbreviation of Samuel Kayon Doe.
4 MSF Belgium was heavily involved in the Ebola response,
even though Belgium had no colonial connection with the
Mano River countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia).
But MSF Belgium’s expertise of Ebola is strongly
correlated with the Democratic Republic of Congo, a
former Belgium colony and which in 1976 experienced
the first Ebola outbreak.
5 Sylvain Landry B. Faye did fieldwork in Mali as well, as
part of the WHO response team.
6 A writing seminar entitled Ebola in Comparison was
convened at the ENS de Lyon on 14–15 February 2017 by
Frédéric Le Marcis. The five co-authors shared their
respective analyses of the Ebola epidemic in the Mano
River countries with the aim of building on the compara-
tive methods. Further discussions and writing took place
on Google Docs and by email.
7 ELWA ETUs 2 and 3 were named after the nearby ELWA
hospital, which belongs to ELWA ministries (Eternal Love
Winning Africa), part of SIM (Sudan Interior Mission), an
international Christian mission that has operated in
Liberia since 1952.
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